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INTHEUTAHCOURTOF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
V.

Case No. 20150623-CA
CARL HOLM,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant is not incarcerated.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant Carl Holm appeals from a Sentence and Judgment for a conviction of
Negligent Homicide, a class-A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code§ 76-5-206. Mr.
Holm filed a timely appeal. R.257-258. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code§ 78A-4-103(2)(e). [The Sentence and Judgment is included in Addendum A].

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue #1: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in voir dire when it denied
Mr. Holm the opportunity to conduct individual voir dire on potential jurors who
indicated they or a close friend had been involved in a serious car accident, where such
follow-up questioning would have enabled Mr. Holm to determine if the potential juror
was biased and to exercise informed peremptory challenges.
Standard of Review: "Challenges to the trial court's management of jury voir dire
are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Alcazar v. Univ. of Utah Hospitals
& Clinics, 2008 UT App 222, ,r 9, 188 P.3d 490 (citation omitted). "[T]hat discretion
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must be liberally exercised in favor of allowing counsel to elicit necessary information
for ferreting out bias, whether for a for-cause or a peremptory challenge." State v.

Saunders, 1999 UT 59,134, 992 P.2d 951 (quotation omitted) (italics original).
Preservation: Mr. Holm preserved this issue by requesting the trial court to
conduct individual voir dire of the potential jurors who had indicated they or someone
close to them had been involved in a serious car accident. R.358-359, 367. The trial
court denied Mr. Holm's request, reasoning that the potential jurors had indicated they
would have no bias. R.359, 367.
Issue #2: Whether the trial court erred in admitting a photograph showing Mr.

Garcia's dead body pinned in a vehicle shortly after a fatal car accident with paramedics
attending him.
Standard of review: On appeal, "we review 'the trial court's ultimate ruling under
rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence' for abuse of discretion."' State v. Stapley, 2011
UT App 54, 111, 249 P.3d 572 (citation omitted).
Preservation: Mr. Holm preserved this issue by filing a Motion in Limine on
January 28, 2015, see R.91-96, which motion was argued on February 2, 2015 and the
morning of trial. R.269-305, 319-323. The trial court denied the motion and ruled the
photograph was admissible. R.323, 469.
Issue #3: Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Holm's request to

instruct the jury regarding the definition of "simple negligence."
Standard of Review: "A trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction is a question
oflaw, reviewed for correctness." State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168,118,256 P.3d 1102
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(citation omitted).
Preservation: Mr. Holm preserved this issue by requesting the trial court to instruct
the jury regarding the definition of "simple negligence." See R.172, 177, 190, 716-720,
726-727.
Issue #4: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support each element

of Mr. Holm's conviction for Negligent Homicide and whether the district court erred in
denying his motion for directed verdict.
Standard of Review: "A defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at
the conclusion of the [State's] case in chief requires the trial court to determine whether
the defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in his defense." State v.

Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted). This Court will uphold a trial
court's denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence if, "upon reviewing the
evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, some evidence exists
from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ,r 8,988 P.2d 949
(citations omitted). "If the prosecution has failed to present sufficient evidence to
supports its case, the trial court should dismiss." Id. This Court reviews for correctness
"the trial court's conclusion that the evidence established a prima facie case." Id.
(citation omitted).
Preservation: Mr. Holm preserved this issue by making a motion for directed
verdict based on insufficient evidence. Specifically, at the close of the State's case at
trial, Mr. Holm moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State failed to present
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sufficient evidence that he acted with criminal negligence. R.605-606.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An Information was filed on June 10, 2013, charging Mr. Holm with Negligent
Homicide, a class-A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code§ 76-5-206. R.1-3. A jury
trial was held on May 12-14, 2015. R.186-189, 226-228, 235-236. After deliberating
several hours, the jury found Mr. Holm guilty. R.234. The trial court sentenced Mr.
Holms to 365 days in jail. R.254-255.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I.

Introduction.
On September 22, 2012 on Bangerter Highway (hereafter "Bangerter") and the

overpass at State Road 201 (hereafter the "20 I -Overpass Intersection"), Carl Holm ran a
red light causing the death of Francisco Garcia-Ramirez. Neither party disputed that Mr.
Holm ran a red light, that he was driving the speed limit at the time of the accident, or
that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The main issue in dispute was
whether Mr. Holm acted with criminal negligence.

II.

Mr. Holm's Living Situation in 2012.
Joni Holm has been married to Mr. Holm for thirty-four years. R.608. On

September 22, 2012, the couple lived in West Jordan, Utah and had since July 2012.
R.608-609, 623, 670. The couple owned one vehicle - a Mazda MPV minivan. R.485.
The Holms' normal morning routine Monday through Saturday was to leave their home
around 5 :30 a.m. when Ms. Holm would drive Mr. Holm northbound on Bangerter to his
work by the airport; after work, she picked him up and drove home. R.609-610, 614-615,
4
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623-624. When Ms. Holm drove Mr. Holm to work, Mr. Holm sat in the passenger's seat
relaxing and listening to music on headphones. R.613, 616, 625, 648.
The Holms estimated that Ms. Holm drove Mr. Holm to and from work along this
same route (the same route Mr. Holm drove on September 22, 2012) six days a week for
two months. R.615-616, 670-672. Mr. Holm drove the route as the driver two to three
times prior to September 22, 2012. R.617, 626, 652-653, 676.
Ms. Holm testified that Mr. Holm has a habit of using cruise control on freeways
and streets and would move around cars to avoid having to take off cruise control.
R.618-619. However, if Mr. Holm did use cruise control, his habit was to set the speed
no more than six to seven miles an hour over the speed limit. R.620. Ms. Holm does not
know if Mr. Holm had cruise control on the morning of September 22, 2012. R.620.
September 22, 2012 was a unique morning in that Mr. Holm drove himself to
work because Ms. Holm had another commitment. R.610. Mr. Holm left his home
around 5:30 a.m. R.611. According to Ms. Holm. Mr. Holm's demeanor was normal
that morning and seemed as he always does; he did not seem anxious or nervous. R.611612. Mr. Holm did not seem tired to Ms. Holm; the couple went to bed at 9:00 p.m. the
night before, and Mr. Holm believes he slept seven-eight hours that night. R.611, 624.
After Mr. Holm left his home, he stopped at a convenience store in his
neighborhood to buy an energy drink. R.626. He then entered Bangerter on 9000 South
and started driving northbound. R.626.

5
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III.

The Route and 201-Overpass Intersection.

The general layout of Bangerter Highway between 9000 South and shortly before
the 20 I-Overpass Intersection is fairly general in that northbound traffic is on the east
side of the highway and southbound traffic on the west side. R.526-527. The following
are the intersections with traffic signals between 9000 South and the 20 I -Overpass
Intersection on Bangerter Highway: 9000 South, 7000 South, 6200 South, 5400 South,
4700 South, 4100 South, 3500 South, 3100 South, 2700 South (which is also known as
Parkway Blvd), 2400 South, and the Frontage Road. R.685. Each of these intersections
and their traffic signals prior to the 201-Overpass Intersection are standard in that each
has four comers with a traffic signal on each comer (one facing each direction). R.685. 1
It is 1.2 miles between 4700 South and 4100 South; 2.6 miles between 4100 South
and Parkway Blvd; and 1.1 miles between Parkway Blvd and the 201-Overpass
Intersection. R.687. The posted speed limit between 9000 South and 3400 South is 55
mph and 50 mph between 3400 South and the 201-Overpass Intersection. R.691.
The layout of 20 I-Overpass Intersection and its traffic signals is different and
unique from standard intersections. R.685. Unlike a standard intersection where
eastbound/westbound traffic run perpendicular to northbound/southbound traffic, the
northbound and southbound traffic at the 20 I-Overpass Intersection crossover each other
at the beginning of the overpass. R.686. Specifically, as northbound traffic reaches the
201-Overpass Intersection, it crosses over with the southbound traffic lanes, moving from
There are a few unique traffic signals on northbound Bangerter for vehicles
making left turns but the traffic signals at the main intersections are standard. R.686.
6
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the east side of the highway to the west side. R.527, 540. The northbound traffic
maintains this lane of travel over the overpass, at which point northbound traffic again
crosses over the southbound lanes from the west side to the east side of the highway.
R.527, 540. See also State's Exhibit 25 and Defense Exhibits 1-2. With regard to traffic
signals on the 20 I-Overpass Intersection, in addition to northbound and southbound
traffic signals, there are multiple traffic signals for vehicles exiting SR-201 onto
Bangerter Highway. R.532-533. See also Defense Exhibits 1-2.

IV.
~

The Granges' Testimony regarding Mr. Holm.
On September 22, 2012 around 5:45 a.m., Mike and Brittany Grange, a married

couple, entered northbound Bangerter at 7800 South to drive to work. R.408-409, 430.
Mr. Grange drove and Ms. Grange was the passenger. R.432.

It was dark outside with little traffic. R.418-420, 430. As the Granges drove in
the middle lane through the intersection at 5400 South, a vehicle also traveling
northbound passed them in the left lane. R.409, 430, 437. At this point, according to Mr.
Grange, the other vehicle weaved out of its own lane and into the Grange's lane one time
and into the medium two times. R.409, 418. Ms. Grange remembers the other vehicle
going in and out of its lane and coming all the way into their lane and she believes the
vehicle weaved about five times between 5400 South and 4700 South. R.431, 438.
The Granges pulled up to this other vehicle at a stop light at 4 700 South. R.409,
420. When the light turned green, both vehicles proceeded at which point, according to
the Granges, the other vehicle again weaved out of its lane; Mr. Grange believed between
4 700 South and 4100 South, the vehicle weaved into his lane two times and into the
7
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median two times. R.409, 420-421. The other vehicle's speed also increased. R.409,
421, 438. The other vehicle continued to weave out of its lane through the intersection at
4100 South. R.409-410.
Mr. Grange described the other vehicle as being dark and believes it was blue. At
trial, he testified that he was unable to tell if it was a minivan or truck. R.410. At trial,
he stated that he remembered testifying previously that the vehicle "was kind of [a] blue
or greenish truck ... And ... it had a shell on it, but I wasn't sure because it was still dark
at the time." R.418-419, 426. Ms. Grange testified at trial that this vehicle was a blue
Mazda van but she never saw the face of the driver of the other vehicle. R.432, 438, 444.
The Granges decided at some point to try to get the license plate of the other
vehicle to call police because they thought the other driver was impaired. R.410, 431.
The Granges lost sight of the vehicle between 4100 South and Parkway Blvd due
to the other vehicle's speed and because the road curves. R.410-411, 421, 438-439. Both
the Granges estimate they lost visual of the other vehicle for one to two minutes between
4700 South and Parkway Blvd. R.425, 433. They both estimated they themselves were
traveling at one point 70 mph trying to catch up to the other vehicle and the other vehicle
was "way, way ahead ofus." R.411, 439. Mr. Grange knows he was going 70 mph
because he looked at his speedometer as he drove through the light at 3500 South. R.427.
He estimated that the other vehicle at times was going around 90 mph; Ms. Grange
estimated the other vehicle was going 85 mph. R.422, 439.

8
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Ms. Grange testified that they stopped at multiple traffic signals between 4100
South and Parkway Blvd and the other vehicle was not stopped at any of these
intersections. R.439.
The Granges regained sight of what they believed to be the same vehicle stopped
at the traffic signal at Parkway Blvd. R.410-411, 422,425,433,439. The other vehicle
was stopped in a normal fashion. R.424-425, 440. Mr. Grange testified that as they
approached the vehicle from behind to get its license plate number, the traffic light turned
green and the other vehicle "took off." R.410-411, 422.
The Granges testified at trial that after the traffic signal turned green at Parkway
Blvd, the other vehicle continued to weave out of its lane. R.412, 434,440. With regard
to the weaving, however, both Granges remembered testifying previously that the other
vehicle did not weave after Parkway Blvd. Mr. Grange remembered testifying at the
preliminary hearing that the only time he saw the vehicle weave was between 5300 South
and 4700 South. R.424-425. At trial, after testifying that she in fact observed the other
vehicle weaving after Parkway Blvd, Ms. Grange remembered previously testifying that
the only weaving of the vehicle she observed was between 5300 South and 4700 South.
R.441-443, 445.
Mr. Grange estimated that he himself reached speeds of 60 mph between Parkway
Blvd and the 20 I-Overpass Intersection and he was unable to catch up to the other
vehicle. R.423. Ms. Grange estimated they drove about 50 mph between Parkway Blvd
and the 20 I-Overpass Intersection. R.440.

9
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Between Parkway Blvd and the 20 I-Overpass Intersection, there are two
intersections with traffic signals - 2400 South and the Frontage Road - both of which had
green lights for the other vehicle and the Granges. R.412, 422-423.
As the other vehicle approached the 20 I-Overpass Intersection, the Granges saw
that the traffic signal was red. R.412, 434-435. The other vehicle was the first car to
approach the 20 I -Overpass Intersection.
The Granges observed the other vehicle drive through a red light and cause an
accident. R.415. Neither of the Granges saw the other vehicle's brake lights go on as it
approached and entered the intersection. R.423, 435,444. It was still dark outside at the
time of the accident. R.445. Mr. Grange estimates they were 200 feet behind the other
vehicle when the accident occurred; Ms. Grange estimates they were 50-100 feet away.
R.425, 435, 443.

Mr. Grange estimates that the other vehicle was going 70-90 mph when the
accident occurred; Ms. Grange estimated it was going at least 70 mph and possibly faster.
R.423, 441. Ms. Grange believes they were driving 50 mph when the accident occurred.
R.444. Neither of the Granges has training in visually estimating speeds of vehicles, has
never enforced speeds, and is not certified in visually estimating speeds of vehicles.
R.424, 444. Detective Mower, the State's accident reconstructionist, who has been
through Peace Officer Standards and Training ("POST"), discussed that part of "POST"
training is visually estimating speeds and that in his opinion, the general public can be
horrible at visually estimating speeds. R.540.
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Mr. Grange believes that the "blue truck" he observed driving erratically several
miles before at 5300 South was the same vehicle that caused the accident. R.415, 427,
687.

V.

Mr. Holm's Testimony regarding the Accident.
After stopping at a convenience store, Mr. Holm entered northbound Bangerter at

9000 South. R.626. Mr. Holm testified that he believes that at some point while he
drove between 9000 South and the location of the accident, his energy drink slipped out
of the drink holder in the center console area. R.627-628. He reached down to grab the
drink and does not know if this caused him to swerve but may have. R.628-629. Ifhe
did swerve, he would have done so one time. R.629.
With regard to driving at a high rate of speed, Mr. Holm believes he drove 55-60
mph between 9000 South and shortly before the 20 I-Overpass Intersection and believes
he was driving 50 mph - the speed limit - when the accident occurred, which is
consistent with the estimate from the State's accident-reconstruction expert. R.501, 629,
649, 678, 691.
When the light turned green at Parkway Blvd, Mr. Holm did not speed off at a
high rate of speed but thinks he drove no more than a couple of miles per hour over the
speed limit. R.631-632. There were no vehicles at this point in front of him in his
direction of travel. R.634. The lights were green at the next two intersections at 2400
South and the Frontage Road. R.631-632, 675.
As Mr. Holm went through the green traffic signal at the Frontage Road, he looked
towards the next intersection - the 20 I-Overpass Intersection - and saw a green light.
11
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R.635, 663-664. As it tragically turned out, the green light Mr. Holm observed was not
his traffic signal but was the signal for traffic exiting eastbound on the SR-201 to travel
northbound on Bangerter Highway. R.636. Mr. Holm knew that the northbound and
southbound lanes on Bangerter crossed over one another at this point, "so I thought those
green lights were the green lights for me and I was wrong." R.668. He saw a green light
and proceeded. R.636. As he approached the 201-Overpass Intersection, his correct
traffic signal - which was red - was at times briefly obscured by traffic poles and the
pillar by his vehicle on his windshield connecting the roof panel to the vehicle's main
body. R.636, 639,649. Mr. Holm believes he may have looked down for a second and
when he looked up, he realized he had looked at the wrong traffic signal and that his
correct traffic signal was red. R.641. Mr. Holm stated, "I thought it was green and went
to go through and as I looked up, I saw the light was red and ... [it was] too late to stop."
R.639. In summary, Mr. Holm proceeded through the 201-Overpass Intersection without
slowing down because he mistakenly thought he had a green light and failed to see that
his correct traffic signal was red. R.636, 640-641.
Although Mr. Holm tried to brake, it was too late to do so and he hit a Honda
Accord that was traveling southbound on Bangerter in a head-on fashion;2 the Honda
Accord had a green light. R.392, 485.

2

The unique layout of the 201 Overpass Intersection caused Mr. Holm to collide
with the Honda in a head-on fashion. If Mr. Holm had run a red light at a standard
intersection, he likely would have "T-boned" the other vehicle. But, because he ran a red
light at this unique intersection where northbound and southbound traffic cross over each
other, he hit the other vehicle almost directly head-on.
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Defense Exhibits 26, 31, 33, and 36 are photographs at night showing what Mr.
Holm's point of view would have been as he approached the 201-Overpass Intersection.
R.634-637. Defense Exhibit 5 is a daytime photograph depicting the same intersection;
Mr. Holm circled the traffic signal he mistakenly believed was his. R.637-638. 3 When it
is dark outside, one can see the glow of this traffic signal more than in the daylight, as
evident from Defendant's Exhibit 33. R.637-638. Defendant's Exhibits 5 and 6 also
depict how traffic poles at times briefly obstruct the traffic signal at the 20 I-Overpass
Intersection as one is driving northbound. R.649.
Mr. Holm did not dispute that his correct traffic signal was red, nor does he
dispute that as one approaches the intersection, one can clearly see that the correct traffic
signal is visible and clear. R.640, 650, 652, 666-667. He further does not dispute that in
a video taken from Detective Mower's vehicle, the correct traffic signal is visible and that
one has to look past the correct traffic signal to see the traffic signal Mr. Holm believed
was his. R.669.
After the accident, Mr. Holm was transported to the hospital where he spoke with
Detective Keldon Arrington with the West Valley Police Department. R.476. Mr. Holm
consented to a blood draw and was completely cooperative. R.479. Detective Arrington
asked Mr. Holm what had occurred. R.477. Mr. Holm stated he was driving northbound

3

Both Detective Mower and defense's investigator, who both have driven the route,
testified that a driver going northbound on Bangerter who is approaching the 20 I
Overpass Intersection can observe the color of the traffic signal for traffic exiting from
eastbound SR-201 to drive north on Bangerter and that the glow of this traffic signal is
more visible when it is dark outside although it is visible during the day as well. R.532535, R.687-688.
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on Bangerter, came to the 20 I-Overpass Intersection, was confused which traffic signal
was his, that he went through a red light, and caused an accident. R.478. The parties
stipulated that there was no alcohol or controlled substances in Mr. Holm's blood. R.479.
At the time of the accident, Mr. Holm was not on his cell phone, was wearing his
properly prescribed glasses, was not adjusting the radio, was not eating anything, and was
not driving drowsy. R.627, 647-648, 650. Mr. Holm testified he was not speeding along
Bangerter Highway and was not speeding at the time of the accident. R.613, 674. He
admits he should have seen that the traffic signal was red. R.650. He accidently ran a
red light with tragic results.

VI.

Evidence Whether Mr. Holm Had His Headlights On.
The parties disputed at trial whether Mr. Holm had his headlights on at the time of

the accident. Stephanie Daybell was approximately 200-500 feet behind the Honda
Accord when she witnessed a blue minivan collide with the Honda. R.447-448, 451-452454. Ms. Daybell remembers it was dark outside and she could not see the blue minivan
before the crash and believes the blue minivan did not have its headlights on although she
did not have a reason to be looking for headlights. R.452, 454. On the day of the
accident, Ms. Daybell wrote a statement in which she wrote that the minivan did not have
its headlights on. R.457-458.
Jeremy Jones was driving shortly behind the Honda Accord at the time of the
accident; in fact, the impact of the accident caused the Honda to collide with Mr. Jones'
vehicle. R.391-392, 485. Mr. Jones cannot say for certain whether Mr. Holm's minivan
had its headlights on. R.400, 406. Something did however briefly catch Mr. Jones
14
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attention coming from the other direction sh011ly before the collision and Mr. Jones
believes it may have been oncoming headlights, reflection, movement, lights, or a
combination of those. R.396, 403.
During his investigation, Detective Mower inspected the inside of the minivan and
observed that the minivan's headlight switch was not in the full "on" position but was
rather in the first position, meaning that the vehicle's rear red lights and front two amber
lights would be illuminated but not the front headlights. R.485-486, 488, referencing
State's Exhibit 17. Detective Mower did not tum the headlights switch off or adjust them
in any way. R.487. Multiple paramedics were in contact with Mr. Holm's vehicle to
assist him but none of these paramedics touched the headlight switch. R.603-604.
With regard to his headlights, Mr. Holm testified that the first thought he had after
the collision was to exit his vehicle to check on the individuals in the other vehicles.
R.641, 643. When his vehicle came to a standstill, Mr. Holm's first reaction, something
he described as a reflex, was to tum the knob of the headlights off as he attempted to exit
the vehicle. R.643-644. In response to the question, "why [did] you [tum off the
headlights?"], Mr. Holm replied, "I don't know. It's a muscle reflex. You're getting out
of your car, you tum the lights off. That's ... the only way I can explain it." 644. After
realizing he could not get out of the vehicle due to injuries and knowing that his vehicle
was sitting in the dark without headlights on with traffic still driving by, Mr. Holm turned
the park lights on in order for other drivers to see his vehicle. R.641-645, 659.
Mr. Holm testified that he was driving with his headlights on. R.655. He
remembers turning on his headlights when he got in his vehicle at his home. R.656.
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Although he does not specifically remember turning them on when he got back into his
vehicle at the convenience store, he could see the reflection of the headlights on the road
as he drove and believes if his headlights were off, he would have noticed since it was
dark outside. R.650, 651, 656-657, 674.

VII.

Mr. Garcia's Death.
Paramedic Scott Hall responded to the accident and observed that the front

passenger of the Honda Accord - Francisco Garcia - was unconscious, did not have a
pulse, and was not breathing. R.465. Paramedic Hall attended Mr. Garcia while Mr.
Garcia was pinned in the vehicle. R.465-467. Paramedics were eventually able to
extricate Mr. Garcia from the vehicle, performed CPR on him, were unsuccessful, and
pronounced Mr. Garcia dead. R.4 72.
Dr. Erik Christensen, a forensic pathologist employed by the Office of the Medical
Examiner, performed the autopsy of Mr. Garcia. R.580-581. Based on the autopsy, Dr.
Christensen determined the manner of Mr. Garcia's death was an accident and that the
cause of Mr. Garcia's death was blunt force injuries to his chest. R.591.

VIII. Evidence that Mr. Holm was Late to Work.
In September 2012 and the three years previous, Mr. Holm worked at Boise
Packaging (a company by the Salt Lake City Airport), about a seven-minute drive from
the 201-Overpass Intersection. R.593, 646,674. James Skinner was Mr. Holm's
supervisor at the time. R.593. Mr. Holm was scheduled to work on September 22, 2012
from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. R.596, 623. Mr. Holm was expected to be at work at 6:00
a.m.; 6:01 a.m. was considered late. R.596-597. Employees log into a time system when
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they arrive at work to verify they arrive on time. R.597. According to the company's
attendance policy, if an employee is late for work anywhere between one minute and two
hours, that employee receives half an incident point; the employee receives a full incident
point if the employee is over two hours late. R.597-598, 647. The company has a scale
of disciplinary action depending on points an employee receives: if an employee receives
four incident points, the employee receives a verbal warning; additional incident points
require harsher actions such as written warning and eventual termination. R.598-599.
Mr. Skinner does not know how many incident points Mr. Holm had on September 22,
2012. R.598-599. Mr. Holm thinks he may have received a verbal warning a year
previous due to accumulation of incident points but employees can work off incident
points by being consistently on time for a period of time. R.647. Although Mr. Holm
was scheduled to be at work at 6:00 a.m. that morning, he did not feel that he was in a
rush. R.646, 653.
According to Detective Mower, the first 911 call was placed around 6:07-6:08
a.m. R.482. Firefighters/paramedics were dispatched around 6:09 a.m. to respond to the
scene of the accident. R.460-464.

IX.

Testimony from the State's Accident-Reconstruction Expert.
Darren Mower, the State's accident-reconstruction expert, is a detective with West

Valley City and has been part of the traffic-accident-investigation unit for fourteen years.
R.480-481. His responsibilities include responding to serious or fatal car crashes,
conducting investigations, and reconstructing accidents. R.481. On September 22, 2012,
Detective Mower responded to the accident scene. R.482, 485.
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Detective Mower did a reconstruction of the accident. R.490. As part of the
reconstruction, he created diagrams of the accident (see State's Exhibits 21-22) and gave
his best estimate of the speed the minivan was traveling at the time of the accident.
R.490-498. Although Detective Mower is not always able to estimate rates of speed at
the point of impact of an accident, he was able to do so in this case although some of the
methods he sometimes uses - such as the conservation of momentum equation, the
conservation of energy method, and by examining the airbag control module - were not
applicable to this specific accident. R.497-500. However, Detective Mower was able to
give his best estimate of the minivan' s rate of speed at the point of impact based on his
years of training and experience in thousands of car accidents. In Detective Mower's
opinion, Mr. Holm was traveling 50 mph at the time of the accident. R.501. Detective
Mower is confident in his estimate, based on years of experience, even though
eyewitnesses estimated Mr. Holm was traveling much faster. R.537.
Detective Mower also believed that the minivan was crossing over from the first
lane of travel into the second lane at the point of impact. R.495. State's Exhibit 18
depicts the intersection and traffic signal that Mr. Holm ran.
Detective Mower also took video - State's Exhibit 6- in January 2015 from his
patrol car while he drove 50 mph when it was dark outside starting shortly after Parkway
Blvd in the same lane and same travel direction Mr. Holm was driving; Detective Mower
did, however, slow down and stop shortly before the 201-Overpass Intersection. R.505509. The parties stipulated that the intersection layout was the same at trial as it was at
the time of the accident. R.506.
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X.

Testimony that Others are Not Confused with the Intersection.
Multiple people who are familiar with the 20 I-Overpass Intersection testified that

they are not confused with the intersection. Mr. Jones drove through the intersection on
a daily basis for around four years and has never been confused by the traffic signals or
which lane of travel is his. R.401. The Granges, who also traveled through the
intersection for multiple years, have never been confused with the intersection's layout.
R.414, 436. Stephanie Daybell has never been confused with the intersection or traffic
signal and has never run a red light at that location. R.458. Although Ms. Holm stated
that she was never in an accident or ran the red light at the 20 I-Overpass Intersection, she
did think it was difficult at times to identify when she was supposed to stop because there
were "some blind spots" as she approached the intersection. R.616, 621.
Detective Mower personally has not been called to investigate a major crash at the
20 I-Overpass Intersection and has not responded to an accident caused by someone
running the traffic signal at issue. R.520, 543. Based on Officer Mower's knowledge
and investigation, there have been no other major crashes at the same location at issue
from 2012-2015. R.518-520.

XI.

Voir Dire.
On the first day of jury trial on May 12, 2015, the trial court conducted voir dire.

R.330-376. During voir dire, the trial court told the potential jury that "[t]his is a
criminal case. The defendant is charged with ... negligent homicide, that on September
22, 2012, at U-201 overpass Bangerter, ... the defendant did acting with criminal
negligence cause the death of another." R.343. At no point did the trial court inform the
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potential jurors that the allegations were that Mr. Holm caused a car accident resulting in
the death of another.
During voir dire, the trial court asked the venire if anyone or anyone close to them
has been involved in a serious car accident. R.353, 355. Several jurors (jurors 1, 6, 8-1 0,
13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21-26, 28, 31, and 32) answered in the affirmative. R.353-356. The
trial court then asked that of those who had answered in the affim1ative, whether there
was "anything about that experience that makes you feel like you might be biased for one
side or the other?" R.356. Jurors 1, 13, 17, and 26 answered in the affirmative and the
trial court spoke with each individually and allowed counsel to do the same. R.356, 359,
362-363.
Mr. Holm requested the trial court to call in each juror individually4 who indicated
they or someone. close had been involved in a serious car accident to find out more details
and ask follow-up questions in individual voir dire rather than in front of the entire
venire. R.358-359, 367. The trial court refused Mr. Holm's request, reasoning that the
potential jurors had indicated they would have no bias. R.359, 367.
After a two-day trial and after deliberating for several hours, the jury found Mr.
Holm guilty of negligent homicide. R.234.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Holm respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction and remand for
a new trial because (1) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Mr. Holm
4

In addition to jurors 1, 13, 17, and 26, these would have included jurors 6, 8-10,
15, 18, 20, 21-25, 28, 31, and 32).
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to conduct individual voir dire on jurors who indicated they or someone close to them
had been involved in a serious car accident; (2) the trial court erred in admitting a
disturbing photograph of Mr. Garcia's deceased body pinned in his smashed vehicle
despite the unfair prejudice the photograph caused while having little to no probative
value; and (3) the trial court refused to instruct the jury as to the definition of "simple
negligence" despite it being the theory of Mr. Holm's case that he acted with such
negligence but not with criminal negligence. In addition, Mr. Holm asks the Court to
reverse his conviction because (4) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish that he acted with criminal negligence.

ARGUMENT

I.

The Trial Court Abused Its Limited Discretion by Refusing to Conduct
Individual Voir Dire.
A.

General Law regarding Voir Dire.

Vair dire examination serves two purposes: "the detection of actual bias and the
collection of data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory challenge." State v.

Reece, 2015 UT 45, ,r 45, 349 P.3d 712 (citation omitted). "Voir dire questioning is
essential to choosing an impartial jury, and an impartial jury is as essential to a fair
trial. ... " State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ,r13, 992 P.2d 951. Indeed, "the fairness of a
trial may depend on the right of counsel to ask voir dire questions designed to discover
attitudes and biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though they would not have
supported a challenge for cause." State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988)
(quotation omitted).
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Although a trial comi has discretion in limiting voir dire examination, that
discretion must be "liberally exercised" in favor of allowing counsel to elicit necessary
information for ferreting out bias, whether for a for-cause or a peremptory challenge. Id.
"[T]rial counsel should be given considerable latitude in asking voir dire questions,
especially in view of the fact that only counsel will, at the beginning, have a clear
overview of the entire case and the type of evidence likely to be adduced." Id. "All that
is necessary for a voir dire question to be appropriate is that it allow defense counsel to
exercise his peremptory challenges more intelligently." Id.
While a trial court is "[g]enerally ... afforded broad discretion in conducting voir
dire ... that discretion must be exercised in favor of allowing discovery of biases or
prejudice in prospective jurors." Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, iflO, 71 P.3d 601
(emphasis added) (quotations omitted). That discretion in voir dire "is most broad when
it is exercised with respect to questions that have no apparent link to any potential bias,"
but that "discretion narrows ... [when] questions do have some possible link to possible
bias, and when proposed voir dire questions go directly to the existence of an actual bias,
that discretion disappears. The trial court must allow such inquires." Saunders, 1999
UT 59 at ,r 43 (emphasis added). It is not an abuse of discretion for a court to limit voir
dire questions when, "considering the totality of the questioning, counsel was afforded an
adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate the jurors." Reece,
2015 UT 45 at if 45.
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B.

The Trial Court Erred by Limiting Voir Dire.

Here, the trial court abused its limited discretion in refusing to allow individual
questioning regarding jurors' experience with serious car accidents, and this
compromised Mr. Holm's ability to seat a fair and unbiased jury.
The trial court refused Mr. Holm's request to speak to each juror individually5
who indicated they or someone close to them had been involved in a serious car accident,
reasoning that the potential jurors had indicated they would have no bias. R.358-359,
367. This was an emotional case - an individual lost his life due to Mr. Holm running a
red light. Reasonable and detailed inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the jurors'
own experience with serious car accidents was necessary and imperative where it may
have revealed a bias against someone who causes a car accident. By ferreting out the
details of the jurors' experience with such accidents - such as the extent of any injuries,
whether someone ran a red light, the location of the accident, whether speed played a
factor, whether someone died - Mr. Holm would have been able to determine if a juror
was biased against him which was critical to a fair trial.
Even if individual voir dire did not reveal a bias, it would certainly have given Mr.
Holm more information when exercising his right to peremptory challenges. Mr. Holm
would have been able to determine the juror's experience, attitudes, and opinions. See
Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ,r 69, 156 P.3d 739 (stating that "the fairness of a trial may

5

Although the trial court spoke to jurors 1, 13, 17, and 26 individually because they
indicated they would have a bias, the trial court refused Mr. Holm's request to speak to
jurors 6, 8-10, 15, 18, 20, 21-25, 28, 31, and 32. R.353-367.
23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

depend on the right of counsel to ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitude and
biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though such attitudes would not have
supported a challenge for cause"). Besides a few individual jurors the trial court
questioned, Mr. Holm knew nothing of the specifics of these other serious car accidents.
Instead of conducting individual voir dire, the trial court asked these jurors
whether "there [was] anything about that experience that makes you feel like you might
be biased for one side or the other?" R.356. In denying Mr. Holm's request to speak
with each juror regarding their experience with serious car accidents, the trial court
stated: "if we speak with - if it turned out that everyone who has ever been in a car
accident ends up stricken, we would not have enough people by far because so many
people have been in car accidents. So those who said that they are not going to be biased
about that, we're not going to talk to." R.367.
Utah courts have made clear that "effective voir dire questioning of prospective
jurors must not be prevented by a procedure designed to qualify jurors as quickly as
possible on the basis of superficial questions and a declaration by each juror that he or
she can follow the judge's instructions and decide the case fairly." Saunders, 1999 UT
59 at il 34. Voir dire should not be restricted to a "stark little exercise" which discloses
little. Worthen, 765 P.2d at 845 (citations omitted). The reason that such an exercise is
inadequate was explained in State v. Ball:
The most characteristic feature of prejudice is its inability to recognize itself. It is
unrealistic to expect that any but the most sensitive and thoughtful jurors
(frequently those least likely to be biased) will have the personal insight, candor
and openness to raise their hand in court and declare themselves biased. Voir dire
is intended to provide a tool for counsel and the court to carefully and skillfully
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determine, by inquiry, whether biases and prejudices, latent as well as
acknowledged, will interfere with a fair trial if a particular juror serves in it.
685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1984).
"Ruling that a prospective juror is qualified to sit simply because he says he will
be fair ignores the common-sense psychological and legal reality of the situation. It is
not uncommon for people to believe that their 'biases' are in fact nonbiased objective
judgments that are true and correct." Saunders, 1999 UT 59 at ,r 35. "[B]ecause a
prospective juror cannot know much about the case at the time of voir dire, a juror cannot
anticipate how he will react when asked to decide a case once all the facts are known."

Id. The Saunders court made "emphatically clear that a juror's statement alone that he or
she can decide a case fairly pursuant to the law given by the trial court is not a sufficient
basis for qualifying a juror to sit. ... " Id. at ,r 36.
Here, the trial court's substitute question - whether there was anything about their
experience that would make the jurors biased- was insufficient. Based on Mr. Holm's
reading of the trial court's statements, the trial court did not want to take the time to
question each juror individually and seemed hesitant to do so because if too many jurors
had a bias against Mr. Holm, they would be stricken for cause and there would not be
enough jurors to seat a jury. See R.367.
The prospective jurors were not able to recognize a bias at this point in the
proceedings because they knew next to nothing about the case; the jurors did not even
know that the case involved a car accident, let alone the details of the car accident. All
the potential jurors knew at this point was that it was a criminal case that occurred at the
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"U-201 overpass Bangerter in Salt Lake County" where Mr. Holm was charged with
causing the death of another with criminal negligence. R.343. Asking the venire to
declare a bias they did not even recognize was inadequate.

C.

The Error Was Prejudicial.

The trial court's error in limiting voir dire was prejudicial. When a court limits
voir dire, it is not possible for an appellant to prove prejudice in the traditional way. He
cannot "show with any certainty that had certain questions been asked, particular
responses would have been received; that certain jurors would then have been challenged
for cause or peremptorily; and that particular, more favorably predisposed jurors would
have been seated instead, who would have deliberated to a different result." Barrett v.

Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah App. 1993). "Prejudicial error is shown if the
appellant's right to the informed exercise of peremptory challenges has been
'substantially impaired."' Id.
Here, limiting voir dire was reversible error because Mr. Holm was not afforded
an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors. The trial
court limited the scope of voir dire, thereby preventing Mr. Holm from asking the jurors
about "relevant subject area[s] of potential bias." State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861,
867 (Utah 1998). This violated Mr. Holm's right to a fair trial by substantially impairing
his ability to detect biases which would support for-cause and/or peremptory challenges.

Id. at 868. The trial court's error limited Mr. Holm's ability to unearth bias related to
individuals who cause serious car accidents. Given the extent and breadth of the
erroneous rulings limiting voir dire, Mr. Holm's right to detect actual bias to support for26
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cause challenges and his right to sufficient information to intelligently exercise his
peremptory challenges was substantially impaired. Saunders, 1999 UT 59 at 155. Thus,
reversal is required.
II.

The Trial Court Abused Its Limited Discretion by Allowing Introduction of a
Crime-Scene Photograph of Mr. Garcia's Deceased Body.
A.

General Law regarding Unfair Prejudice of a Photograph.

In his January 28, 2015 Motion in Limine, Mr. Holm argued that pursuant to the
three-part test outlined in State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, if 46, 52 P.3d 1210, a disturbing
crime-scene photograph depicting Mr. Garcia's deceased body pinned in the crashed
vehicle with a paramedic attending him was irrelevant, gruesome, and unfairly prejudicial
pursuant to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See R.91-96, 269-305, 319-323,
referencing State's Exhibit 26, attached as Addendum B. The trial court denied Mr.
Holm's motion and despite Mr. Holm's restated objection at trial, the trial court allowed
admission of the photograph into evidence. R.319-320, 323; 469-470.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test for determining whether a
photograph is inadmissible:
First, [the court] determine[s] whether the photograph is relevant. Second, [it]
consider[s] whether the photograph is gruesome. Finally, [it] appl[ies] the
appropriate balancing test. If the photograph is gruesome, it should not be
admitted unless the State can show that the probative value of the photograph
substantially outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice. If the photograph is not
gruesome, it should be admitted unless the defendant can show that the risk of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the photograph.
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State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, iJ 46, 52 P.3d 1210. Pursuant to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, "[ t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice."
Although Mr. Holm argued to the trial court that the photograph at issue was
inadmissible because it was irrelevant, gruesome, and unfairly prejudicial, Mr. Holm
limits his argument on appeal to the issue that the trial court erred in admitting the
photograph pursuant to part three of the Bluff test and Rule 403 because the risk of unfair
prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the photograph. This Court
"review[s] the trial court's ultimate ruling under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
for abuse of discretion." State v. Stapley, 2011 UT App 54, iJ 11,249 P.3d 572.
With regard to part three of the Bluff test and because the photograph is not
gruesome for purposes of this appeal, "[the photograph] should be admitted unless the
defendant can show that the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative
value of the photograph." Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at iJ 46. In other words, because Mr. Holm
does not contend on appeal that the photograph is gruesome, this Court must apply the
presumptively admissible standard.

B.

The Photograph Has Little to No Probative Value.

Photographs of the victim's injuries have "limited probative value" if they serve
only to corroborate "uncontested facts." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 87, if 40, 57 P.3d
220. On the other hand, photographs can be extremely prejudicial. All the material facts
which could conceivably have been adduced from viewing the photograph at issue had
been established by uncontradicted testimony.
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Here, there is very little - if any - probative value in admitting the photograph.
The State admitted State's Exhibit 26 because "it goes to a key element that [the State
has] to prove and that is cause of death." R.274. Although cause of death was an
element of the offense, it was not an element that was "of great importance in the case
[or] hotly contested by the parties." Calliham, 2002 UT 87 at ,I 40. Utah appellate courts
have found graphic photographs in murder cases to lack the high degree of evidentiary
significance necessary to overcome their potential to unfairly prejudice the defendant
when they are offered only to prove death. Stapley, 2011 UT App 54 at ,I 21 n. 6, citing

State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1230-31 (Utah 1989) (holding that the portion of a video
recording that lingered on the deceased's body should not have been admitted because
the cause of death had been established, but concluding that the admission of the video
was harmless); State v. Lafferty, 149 P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah 1988) (determining the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting gruesome photographs of the victims' corpses
where they "convey[ed] little information beyond the fact that the victims died violent
and bloody deaths" but nevertheless upholding the conviction because the error was not
prejudicial); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 753-54 (Utah 1986) (reversing the defendant's
conviction where gruesome photographs of the victim's mutilated body were admitted
after the defendant conceded that he had intentionally killed her with a knife).
Mr. Holm never disputed that he ran a red light that resulted in Mr. Garcia's death.
R.478, 650. Rather, he asserted that he did not act with criminal negligence. State's
Exhibit 26 was not probative of this issue and its evidentiary value was weak.
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C.

Admission of the Photograph Was Unfairly Prejudicial.

On the other hand, the exhibit created a great danger of unfair prejudice. Unfair
prejudicial is defined as "having an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis, commonly but not necessarily an emotional one, such as bias, sympathy, hatred,
contempt, retribution or horror." Stapley, 2011 UT App 54 at ,r 18. The main purpose of
the State's Exhibit 26 was to "inflame and arouse the jury" 6 by showing them a graphic
photograph of Mr. Garcia deceased body, elicit sympathy for Mr. Garcia, and create
revulsion for Mr. Holm as the person who caused the accident. State's Exhibit 26 is an
enlarged 8 x IO inch photograph that shows a close-up shot of Mr. Garcia sitting upright
pinned in his smashed vehicle with wet blood around his mouth and nose. The
photograph is in color and provides a vivid image of how Mr. Garcia's lifeless body
looked shortly after the accident. A paramedic is seen attending Mr. Garcia with wires
connected to him and it appears the paramedic is checking for signs of a pulse. Mr.
Garcia's mouth is gapping open and it appears his eyes are rolled back. He is sitting in a
smashed vehicle with the windshield cracked in several places due to the accident.
Even the State acknowledged to the trial court the upsetting nature and prejudicial
effect of the photograph: "[the photograph is] upsetting but it should be. It's an upsetting
case. Somebody lost their life and that's what we're going to be talking about. And the
jury needs to know that. .. [I]t's a homicide case and a person's life was lost and so we're
expected to see upsetting photographs. Is it prejudicial? Absolutely." R.273-274.
Weighed together, the limited probative value of the photograph was substantially
6

State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512,515 (Utah 1968).
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outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting the photograph.

III.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Mr. Holm's Request to Define "Simple
Negligence" for the Jury.
A.

General Law regarding Requested Jury Instructions.

"A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the
case." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). "The defendant has a right to
have his or her theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way.
However, ... it is not error to refuse a proposed instruction if the point is properly
covered in the other instructions." Id.
"Whether the trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction constitutes
error is a question of law, which we review for correctness." Id. The appellate court
"review[ s] jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether the instructions, taken
as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law." State v. Stringham, 951 P.2d
602, 608 (Utah App. 1998).
The trial court denied Mr. Holm's request to define "simple negligence" for the
jury. See R.172, 177, 190, 16-720, 726-727. Mr. Holm's requested jury instruction
defining "simple negligence" is attached as Addendum C.

B.

The Trial Court Erred in Refusing Mr. Holm's Requested Jury
Instruction.

At trial, Mr. Holm did not dispute that he ran a red light and caused the death of
another person. However, the entire theory of Mr. Holm's defense was that he did not act
with criminal negligence, but rather acted with simple negligence. An instruction
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defining a term is necessary when the term "has a technical legal meaning so different
from its ordinary meaning that the jury, without further explanation, would
misunderstand its import in relation to the factual circumstances." State v. Ekstrom, 2013
UT App 271, ,r 15,316 P.3d 435 (citation omitted).
Mr. Holm was entitled to have a jury instruction that clearly defined the ordinary
standard of care- i.e., simple negligence- in order to present his theory of the case to the
jury in "a clear and understandable way." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238. Mr. Holm's
requested jury instruction defining "simple negligence" is directly from the Utah Model
Jury Instructions, attached as Addendum D, which states: "Simple negligence means
failing to exercise that degree of care which reasonable and prudent persons exercise
under like or similar circumstances." At trial, it appears the trial court denied Mr. Holm's
requested definition based on the State's argument, see R.717-719, that it was
inappropriate to include the definition of "simple negligence" due to the Committee
Notes of the Utah Model Jury Instruction which states:
[The "simple negligence"] instruction will be used in only very limited criminal
prosecutions, such as Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-207(2)(c), Automobile Homicide,
or 76-10-1206, Dealing in Material Harmful to a Minor; see also State v. Haltom,
2007 UT 22. Although the Committee is only aware of these two statutes, caution
should be exercised to ensure the appropriate mental state instruction is used in
criminal cases where negligence is asserted.
The basis of the Committee Note is that there are very limited crimes - in fact only
two crimes of which the Committee is aware - in which "simple negligence" is the actual
requisite mens rea. However, the Committee Note does not and should not preclude a
defendant, such as Mr. Holm, from presenting an alternative mens rea under which he
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acted in arguing to the jury that he did not act with the mens rea of the statute under
which he is charged. It was important in this type of case in particular where the two
types of mens rea at issue (criminal negligence v. simple negligence) have similarities but
important differences.
Mr. Holm recognizes that it is not error for a trial court to refuse a requested jury
instruction if "the point is properly covered in the other instructions." Hamilton, 827
P.2d at 238. However, the jury had no clear definition from the other jury instructions as
to Mr. Holm's theory of the case - that he was not guilty because he at most acted with
"simple negligence." The only arguable jury instruction which could have given the jury
guidance as to the definition of "simple negligence" is Jury Instruction 27 which states:
Conduct is not criminally negligent unless it constitutes a "gross deviation" from
the standard of care exercised by an ordinary person. Ordinary negligence, which
is the basis for civil action for damages, is not sufficient to constitute criminal
negligence. Mere inattention or mistake in judgment resulting even in death of
another is not criminal unless the quality of the act makes it so. Criminal
negligence must be more than the lack of ordinary care and precaution; it must be
something more than mere inadvertence or misadventure.

See R.214. 7
Although Jury Instruction 27 uses the term "ordinary negligence," it does not
define it and only discusses that it must be more than certain things. In addition, Jury
Instruction 27 is inadequate because, among other things, it makes it appear that
"ordinary negligence's" domain is limited to civil actions, something that the Utah

7

The language from Jury Instruction 27 was taken from State v. Larsen, 2000 UT
App 106, ii 18,999 P.2d 1252.
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Supreme Court has rejected. See State v. Haltom, 2007 UT 22, ,r 8, 156 P.3d 792 (stating
that "[o]rdinary negligence is, of course, the basis for civil damage actions. Its domain is
not, however, bounded to civil actions."). 8 It was necessary for the jury to understand
clearly the legal distinction between simple negligence and criminal negligence. By not
having the definitions of both simple and criminal negligence, Mr. Holm was unable to
present his defense in a clear and understandable way.

C.

The Instruction Error Prejudiced Mr. Holm.

Generally, this Court will reverse for an instruction error "if a review of the record
persuades the Court that without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for the defendant." State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984).
In other words, Mr. Holm need not show "that the jury would have more likely than not"
returned a different verdict but for the instruction errors. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ,i
92, 152 P.3d 321. Rather, error is prejudicial if there is "a probability sufficient to
8

While arguing jury instructions at trial, the parties disagreed as to whether there is
a legal distinction between "ordinary negligence" and "simple negligence." See R.719728. It was and still is Mr. Holm's position that the two are the same and that the
definition of "simple negligence" in the Utah Model Jury Instruction is used in both civil
and criminal contexts. See, e.g., State v. Haltom, 2007 UT 22, ,i 8, 156 P.3d 792 (stating
that although "ordinary negligence" is the basis for civil actions, "[i]ts domain is not ...
bounded to civil actions"); Mitchell v. Pearson Enter., 697 P.2d 240,243 n.8 (Utah 1985)
(defining "negligence" in the context of a wrongful-death action as "the failure to do
what a reasonable and prudent person would have done under the circumstances"); Meese
v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1981) (defining "negligence" in the
setting of a personal-injury case as "the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent
person would have done under the circumstances"); State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226, 1227
(Utah 1979) (stating that the definition of "simple negligence," that is "used generally in
tort cases," is "the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would have done
under the circumstances").
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undermine [the Court's] confidence in the outcome." Id. Here, there was a reasonable
probability of a different result but for the instruction error.
There was evidence to support Mr. Holm's theory of defense that although he may
have been negligent, he did not act with criminal negligence. The parties did not dispute
that Mr. Holm was driving the speed limit at the time of the accident and that he did not
have alcohol or drugs in his system. R.479, 501. Although others were not confused
with the layout of the intersection, 9 there was no dispute that it was a unique intersection
and unlike any of the previous intersections that Mr. Holm - who had only driven
previously through the 201-Overpass Intersection as the driver a few times- had driven
through that morning. R.527, 540, 652-653, 685-686. Mr. Holm erroneously thought he
had a green light.
This case is similar to State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, ,r,r 3-7, 999 P.2d 1252,
discussed more fully in Section IV below, a negligent homicide case where the defendant
failed to yield to oncoming traffic and caused an accident that resulted in the death of
another. The Larsen court reversed defendant's conviction by concluding that there was
insufficient evidence to establish that the defendant acted with criminal negligence in
causing the accident. Id. at ,r 22. In so deciding, the Larsen court discussed the
differences between criminal negligence and ordinary negligence and stated that although
the defendant's conduct was "apparently negligent, [it did] not rise to the level of
criminal negligence. Defendant's conduct is more accurately characterized as a serious
mistake in judgment." Id. at ,r 20.
9

R.401, 414,436,458, 518-520, 616.
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Had the jury had both definitions of criminal and simple negligence, there was a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for Mr. Holm. By having both legal
definitions, the jury would have been able to compare the two - like the court did in
Larsen - and understand that although Mr. Holm's actions were a serious mistake in

judgment and outside the ordinary standard of care, his actions did not rise to the level of
criminal negligence. The instruction error prevented Mr. Holm from presenting a
complete defense which error seriously calls into question the jury's verdict.
IV.

There is Insufficient Evidence that Mr. Holm Committed the Crime of
Negligent Homicide.

If the prosecution fails to produce "believable evidence of the all elements of the
crime charged, the trial court must dismiss the charges." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,

il 41, 70 P.3d 111 (citation omitted). "[I]fupon reviewing the evidence and all inferences
that can be reasonably drawn from it, the court concludes that some evidence exists from
which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven
beyond a reasonable, [the Court] will uphold the denial of a motion to dismiss." Id.
This Court "will reverse only if the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime." State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, il 10, 2 P.3d 954
(quotation omitted). Though the burden of establishing insufficiency of the evidence "is
high, it is not impossible." Id. (citation omitted). This Court "will not make speculative
leaps across gaps in the evidence." Id. (citation omitted). "Every element of the crime
charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citation omitted). In other
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words, this Court "must be sure the [State] has introduced evidence sufficient to support
®

all elements of the charged crime." Id. (citation omitted).
Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mr. Holm presents
the marshaled evidence: 10
1. A few miles prior to the accident, the Granges observed what they believed
to be Mr. Holm's vehicle weaving out of his lane of travel and speeding at a
high rate of speed between 5400 South and 4100 South. R.409, 418,431,
438. They also believed Mr. Holm was speeding at the time of the
accident. R.423, 441.
2. As Mr. Holm approached the 20 I-Overpass Intersection, he saw a traffic
signal with a green light and mistakenly thought it was his light but testified
that one can clearly see that the correct traffic signal is visible and clear.
R.635, 660-664. 650, 652, 666-667.
3. The layout of 201-Overpass Intersection and its traffic signals is different
and unique from standard intersections and the previous intersections Mr.
Holm drove through that morning. R.685.
4. Mr. Holm drove the same route as the driver two to three times prior to

10

In State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r 41, 326 P.3d 645, our supreme court
"repudiate[ d] the default notion of marshaling." It also "repudiate[ d] the requirements of
playing 'devil's advocate' and of presenting 'every scrap of competent evidence' in a
'comprehensive and fastidious order.'" Id. at il 43. While marshaling maintains an
important role in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the focus on this
Court's analysis should "be on the merits, not on some arguable deficiency in the
appellant's duty of marshaling." Id. at il 42.
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September 22, 2012. R.617, 626, 652-653, 676.
~

5. Mr. Holm ran a red light and caused an accident that resulted in the death of
Mr. Garcia. R.415, 472. Mr. Holm did not apply his brakes before entering
the intersection and causing the accident. R.423, 435, 444.

~

6. Mr. Holm was driving 50 mph - the speed limit - when the accident
occurred, which neither party disputed and which was the estimate of the
~

State's accident-reconstruction expert. R.501, 629, 649, 678, 691.
7. There was no alcohol or controlled substances in Mr. Holm's blood at the
time of the accident. R.4 79.

Ii)

8. At the time of the accident, Mr. Holm was not on his cell phone, was
wearing his properly prescribed glasses, was not adjusting the radio, was
~

not eating anything, and was not driving drowsy. R.627, 647-648, 650.
9. Ms. Daybell believes that Mr. Holm did not have his headlights on at the
time of the accident. R.452, 454, 457-458. Detective Mower observed
after the accident that Mr. Holm's vehicle had its headlight switch in the
first position, meaning that the vehicle's rear red lights and front two amber
lights would be illuminated but not the front headlights. R.485-486, 488,
referencing State's Exhibit 17. Neither Detective Mower nor paramedics
turned Mr. Holm's headlight switch off or adjusted them in any way.
R.487, 603-604.
10. Mr. Holm was running a few minutes late to work when the accident
occurred and was expected to be there on time. R.482, 596, 623.
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~

11. Other people who are familiar with the 20 I-Overpass Intersection are not
confused with the intersection's layout or its traffic signals. R.401, 414,
436, 458, 616, 621. There have been no other major crashes at the same
location at issue from 2012-2015. R.518-520.
Although at trial Mr. Holm disputed some of the evidence- such as that he was
weaving multiple times out of his lane of travel around 4 700 South, that he was speeding,
and that he did not have his headlights on at the time of the accident - Mr. Holm
recognizes that for purposes of this issue on appeal, the Court views the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict. However, evidence that the parties did not dispute at
trial was that at the time of the accident Mr. Holm was going to the speed limit, he did
not have any alcohol or drugs in his system, that the 20 I-Overpass Intersection is
different and unique from the other intersections Mr. Holm drove through that morning,
and that Mr. Holm had driven through 20 I -Overpass Intersection as the driver only a few
times previously. R.479, 501, 527, 540, 652-653, 685-686.
In a factually similar case, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed a negligenthomicide conviction for insufficiency-of-the-evidence. See Larsen, 2000 UT App 106.
In Larsen, the defendant driver made a left tum at a normal speed at an intersection and
collided with an oncoming car (that had the clear right-of-way); the other vehicle would
have been visible to the defendant had he been looking. The defendant did not apply his
brakes or try to swerve before the other car collided with him. Id. at iJ 18. The defendant
had an open container of alcohol in his truck, had a small amount of alcohol in his
system, did not have his headlights on (it was dusk at the time of the accident), and failed
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to activate his tum signal before turning. Id. at if1 6-7. One of the passengers in the
oncoming car was killed as a result of the collision, and the defendant was convicted of
negligent homicide. Id. at ,r,r 7-8. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence on appeal and the Utah Court of Appeals determined that while the defendant's
conduct was negligent, it was not a gross deviation from the standard of care. Id. at ,r 24.
According to the Larsen court, there was no nexus between the collision and the presence
of alcohol, the absence of headlights, or inactivated tum signal. Id. at ,r 20. While the
defendant's conduct was "apparently negligent, [it] did not rise to the level of criminal
negligence. Defendant's conduct is more accurately characterized as a serious mistake in
judgment." Id. at ,r 21. The Larsen court determined that the state's evidence was
insufficient to establish that the defendant acted with criminal negligence and reversed
his conviction. Id. at ,r 21.
Like the defendant in Larsen, although Mr. Holm may have been negligent, his
conduct was not a gross deviation from the standard of care. Both Mr. Holm and the

Larsen defendant were going the speed limit at the time of the accident; both did not
apply their brakes or try to swerve before colliding with the car; both did not have their
headlights on when they should have (and the failure to have their headlights on did not
contribute to either accident); and both collided with an oncoming car due to a failure to
stop or yield when they should have been looking properly but failed to do so. If
anything, Mr. Holm was less at fault than the defendant in Larsen who at the time of the
accident had also failed to signal and had alcohol in his system. Id. at 20. Like the court
in Larsen, Mr. Holm respectfully asks this Court to reverse his conviction for negligent
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homicide because the facts do not support the jury's detennination that he acted with
criminal negligence. Mr. Holm's conduct, like the defendant is Larsen, can be "more
accurately characterized as a serious mistake in judgment." Id. at 121.

V.

The Cumulative Errors Require Reversal.

Considering "'all the identified errors"' addressed above, "'as well as any other
errors [this Court] assume[s] may have occurred,"' this Court should reverse because
""'the cumulative effect of the several errors undennines [] confidence ... that a fair trial
was had."'" State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 125, 999 P.2d 7 (final alteration in original).
Here, the trial court erroneously prohibited Mr. Holm from conducting complete voir
dire, admitted prejudicial evidence, refused to instruct the jury as to Mr. Holm's theory of
the case, and denied Mr. Holm's motion or a directed verdict. The cumulative effect of
these errors undermines confidence that Mr. Holm had a fair trial.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Holm asks this Court to reverse his conviction for insufficiency of the
evidence. In the alternative, Mr. Holm asks this Court to reverse and remand for a new
trial.
SUBMITTED this

Ji.' f-h

day of February, 2016.
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1. NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 05/14/2015 Guilty
SENTENCE JAIL

Based on the defendant's conviction of NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE a Class A Misdemeanor, the
defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
Credit is granted for time served.
Credit is granted for 67 day(s) previously served.
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Restitution is left open.
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JURY INSTRUCTION

A person acts with criminal negligence when he should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that certain circumstances exist relating to his conduct or the result will occur.
The nature and extend of the risk must be of such a magnitude that failing to perceive it is a gross
deviation from what an ordinary person would perceive in all the circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint. 1
A person acts with simple negligence when he fails to exercise that degree of care which
reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances. 2
"Conduct" means either an act or an omission to act.
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CR305 Simple Negligence.
Simple negligence means failing to exercise that degree of care which reasonable and prudent persons
exercise under like or similar circumstances.

References
State v. Haltom, 2007 UT 22, ,is, 156 P.3d 792.
Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1981).

Committee Notes
This instruction will be used in only very limited criminal prosecutions, such as Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5207(2)(c), Automobile Homicide, or 76-10-1206, Dealing in Material Harmful to a Minor; see also State v.
Haltom, 2007 UT 22. Although the Committee is only aware of these two statutes, caution should be
exercised to ensure the appropriate mental state instruction is used in criminal cases where negligence is
asserted.
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